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THE INCREASING NEED FOR ARBITRATION IN ACTION SPORTS
By
Rachel Bires*
The popularity of Action Sports has steadily been rising since the
introduction of widely-televised events, especially with events such as the ESPN
X-Games. Joe Tomlinson, an author who has written several books on the topic of
extreme sports, lists nine air sports, eighteen land sports, and fifteen water sports
that are considered “extreme sports,” now dubbed “action sports,” in his book
entitled, “Extreme Sports.”1 Due to the amount of sports that are considered Action
Sports, particularly the sports that are included in the ESPN X-Games, there is a
growing need for arbitration for all parties involved. These action sports, especially
Skateboarding and Bicycle Motocross (“BMX”), which are increasing in
popularity both in the United States and internationally, would benefit from
arbitral clauses in various aspects of their sports, including endorsement contracts
and in the dispute resolution clauses of the bylaws of their governing bodies for
recognition by the United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) for potential
Olympic competition.
I.

INTRODUCTION
The world of action sports is growing in popularity. With big name

athletes serving as role models, such as Tony Hawk, Dave Mirra, Mat Hoffman,
Shaun White, and Ryan Sheckler, more and more children and young adults are
being drawn into the sports in the role as either a spectator, or a participant.
Compared to other sports, action sports are unique; in Skateboarding and BMX,
athletes as young as thirteen are competing as professionals, and amateur athletes
in these sports are starting at even younger ages. Arbitration and arbitration
*

Rachel Bires is a 2011 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State University
Dickinson School of Law.
1
JOE TOMLINSON, EXTREME SPORTS (Carlton Publishing Group 2002).
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provisions are a viable and important option for agreements that will benefit these
sports, the athletes that compete, and the companies that invest in both these sports
and the athletes. Arbitration agreements in the governing bodies of these sports, in
the competitions in which the athletes compete, and in the endorsement agreements
these athletes contract into, would benefit both the sports and the athletes involved.
II.

ISSUES IN SPORTS ARBITRATION

A.

Endorsement Contracts
Many action sports athletes have received lucrative endorsement contracts

with major companies. Shaun White, a professional skateboarder and snowboarder,
has or has had endorsement deals with large companies such as Burton
Snowboards, Target, Red Bull, Oakley, Inc, and Hewlett-Packard.2 There are also
many other athletes who may be less known to the general public that have
endorsement contracts with major equipment, clothing, shoe, and energy drink
companies. Additionally, other, non-traditional, companies are investing their
money in actions sports athletes. For example, Skullcandy, a headphone company,
sponsors several Skateboarders and BMX riders.3
Many of these athletes may not be privy to the legalities involved in their
endorsement contract; rather, these athletes may be entrusting these agreements
with management companies or agents. While there are no cases involving action
sports athletes and their endorsement agreements, there are some cases involving
athletes in other sports that may shed some light on issues involving action sports
athletes and their endorsement contracts.
Track and Field athletes are similar to action sports athletes in that they
sometimes compete individually, even against their own ‘teammates,’ and also
2

Shaun White Official Website, http://www.shaunwhite.com (last visited November 21,
2010).
3
Skull Candy, http://www.skullcandy.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
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enter into endorsement contracts individually. In Hicks v. HSInternational Sports
Management, Inc.,4 the United States District Court for the District of Oregon held
that if all of the claims brought by a Plaintiff fall within an agreement to arbitrate,
the court must grant the motion to compel arbitration, particularly when the
Plaintiff claims that the entire agreement is void; that claim is for the arbitrator to
decide, not the courts.5 Kevin Hicks, a track and field athlete, signed with
HSInternational Sports Management, Inc. (“HIS”) to act as his agent.6 In the
agreement, Hicks agreed to pay HSI fifteen percent of the “money received in
connection with fees, bonuses, and prize money in exchange for HSI’s best efforts
to negotiate his contracts and manage his racing career.”7 Hicks entered into a four
and a half year contract with Nike, which was to begin on July 1, 2005.8 The
contract provided for reductions in Hicks’ base salary if he failed to participate in a
requisite number of events or if he “failed to attain certain results” in these events.9
When HSI failed to enter Hicks into the requisite number of events that were
necessary to meet the standards of the Nike contract, Nike reduced Hicks’ base
salary.10 In March 2008, Hicks terminated his management agreement with HSI in
writing, claiming that HSI violated California law by “failing to make appropriate
filings and by failing to make required disclosures in the management
agreement.”11 Hicks further sought a declaration that the management agreement is
void and unenforceable, and because his claims arose out of HSI’s conduct and did
not relate to the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement, he is not subject to
binding arbitration.12 The agreement in issue provided, in part:

4

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138 (2009).
Id. (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
5
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Dispute Resolution: If ATTORNEY/AGENT and CLIENT
are unable to reach an agreement regarding a dispute
between them arising out of this retention, the dispute shall
be subject to binding arbitration to be held in Orange
County, California before a retired California Superior Court
judge. Judgment on the arbitrator’s award shall be final and
binding and may be entered in any competent court.13
Hicks sought to avoid this provision specifically because he argued that his claims
arose out of HSI’s conduct, which Hicks argued resulted in harm to him in
violation of tort law and state statute.14 Hicks argued that his claims were not
related to the interpretation or enforcement of the agreement with HSI.15 The court
stated that because some of Hick’s claims depend on an interpretation of the
contractual agreement, the claims are arbitrable.16 The court additionally stated that
because the arbitration provision was drafted in a way that was not limited only to
disputes arising out of the agreement, but also to disputes arising out of the
“retention which resulted in the agreement”, Congress’ intent requires the court to
“liberally interpret the clause in favor of arbitration.”17 The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) reflects Congress’ intent to “provide for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause.”18 The FAA “embodies
a clear federal policy in favor of arbitration,”19 and “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”20
Additionally, “a court, in construing a valid arbitration agreement under the FAA,
13

Id.
Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. (citing Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.3d 469, 475 (9th cir. 1991)
(citing Prerry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987))).
19
Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138. (discussing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
20
Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)).
14
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applies ordinary principles of state contract law to determine whether the parties
have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.”21 The court in Hicks, noting that the
parties have agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of “retention,” states that this
provision refers not only to “disputes involving interpretation and performance of
the agreement, but also to disputes regarding the hiring process, disclosures, and
other matters related to the contract.”22 As the parties did not limit the disputes to
“claims involving interpretation and performance of the contract, the factual
allegations raised in the complaint need only touch upon matters covered by the
contract.”23 The matters on which the allegations must touch upon not only include
issues regarding the formation of the contract, but also “any violations of law in
connection therewith.”24 Since Hicks did not argue that the arbitration clause was
void or unconscionable, but that the entire agreement was void, the court states that
an arbitrator, and not the court, must determine such claims.25
The Hicks case illustrates the need for arbitral clauses in endorsement
contracts that are narrower in scope. If Hicks and HSI had limited the scope of the
agreement to disputes regarding only the interpretation and performance of the
agreement, not disputes arising out of the retention that resulted in the agreement,
Hicks may have had a cause of action in the court. As many professional action
sports athletes have endorsement agreements, a dispute resolution clause with a
more limited scope may be more beneficial in order to protect the parties involved,
allowing them to properly vindicate their claims.

21

Id. (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
Id.
23
Id.
24
Hicks, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138.
25
Id.
22
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Olympic Arbitration
Although Skateboarding and BMX are not currently Olympic sports, there

is a possibility that they will be in the future due to their increasing popularity both
nationally and internationally. When these sports become an Olympic sport, they
will have to be recognized by Olympic Committees in their respective countries,
and submit themselves to the constitution and bylaws of these committees,
including their dispute resolution provisions. In the United States, these sports
would need to be recognized by the USOC in accordance with the Ted Stevens
Olympic and Amateur Sports Act.
Under the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (Stevens Act),26
qualification for membership in the USOC is provided in the constitution and
bylaws of the committee.27 Sections 220504(b)(1)-(4) of the Act states that the
committee “shall establish and maintain provisions with respect to its governance
and the conduct of its affairs for reasonable representation of”28 “amateur sports
organizations recognized as national governing bodies,”29 “amateur athletes
actively engaged in amateur athletic competition or who have represented the
United States in international amateur athletic competition within the preceding ten
years,”30 “amateur sports organizations that conduct a national program or regular
national amateur athletic competition in two or more sports included on the
program for the Olympic games,”31 or “individuals not affiliated or associated with

26

The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529 (1998).
(This act governs the USOC, and puts for requirements and procedures for its member
national governing bodies for individual sports).
27
36 U.S.C. § 220504(a).
28
Id. § 220504(b).
29
Id. § 220504(b)(1).
30
Id. § 220504(b)(2).
31
Id. § 220504(b)(3).
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any amateur sports organization who, in the committee’s judgment, represent the
interests of the American public in the activities of the corporation.”32
Under the Act, the committee shall establish and maintain provisions in its
constitution and bylaws for the “swift and equitable resolution of disputes
involving any of its members and relating to the opportunity of an amateur athlete,
coach, trainer, manager, administrator, or official to participate in the Olympic
games…world championship competition, or other protected competition as
defined in the constitution and bylaws.”33 The Act states that the committee “shall
hire and provide salary, benefits, and administrative expenses for an Ombudsman
for athletes”34 that shall “provide independent advice to athletes at no cost about
the applicable provisions of the act and the constitution and bylaws of the
committee…with respect to resolution of any dispute”35 as discussed in the
previous section, assist in mediating any such disputes,36 and report to the
Athletes’ Advisory Council on a regular basis.37 A party that is aggrieved by a
determination of the committee, under section 220527 (Complaints against
national governing bodies) or section 220528 (Applications to replace an
incumbent national governing body) of the act, “may obtain review of the claims
by any regional office of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).”38 The
arbitral clause of the act provides the following procedures: that the “demand for
arbitration must be submitted within thirty days of the committee’s
determination;”39 that “upon receipt the AAA must serve notice to both parties and
immediately proceed with arbitration according to their commercial rules;”40 that
“the panel shall consist of three arbitrators unless the parties agree to a lesser
32

36 U.S.C. § 220504(b)(4).
Id. § 220509(a).
34
Id. § 220509(b)(1).
35
Id. § 220509(b)(1)(A).
36
Id. § 220504(b)(1)(B)
37
36 U.S.C. § 220504(b)(1)(C).
38
Id. § 220529(a).
39
Id. § 220529(b)(1).
40
Id. § 220529(b)(2).
33
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number;”41 that “the AAA shall select the site unless the parties agree to the use of
another site;”42 that “the arbitration hearing shall be open to the public;”43 that “the
decision shall be by majority vote unless the parties require concurrence of all
arbitrators;”44 “relaxed conformity to the legal rules of evidence;”45 “settlement of
the dispute before a final award;”46 a final and binding decision;47 and “a reopening
of hearings.”48 When either Skateboarding or BMX have a national governing
body recognized by the USOC as eligible for membership, these sports would not
only be required to follow the constitution and bylaws of the committee, but also
the provisions for dispute resolution, including arbitration, as provided for by the
Act.
If, after being recognized as eligible for membership by the USOC, the
member and the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA,
the arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’
agreement as discussed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decision in Jacobs v. USA Track & Field and United States Anti-Doping
Agency.,49 In Jacobs, a “world-class” track athlete appealed from the denial by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of her petition
to compel arbitration regarding a dispute with defendants regarding a doping
violation and a suspension from the 2004 Olympic Games.50 The parties agreed to
arbitrate their dispute, but there was a disagreement over which two sets of rules of
the AAA, Commercial Rules or Supplementary Procedures, governs the
arbitration.51 Although the parties agreed that it is for the arbitrators to decide
41

Id. § 220529(b)(2)(A).
36 U.S.C. § 220529(b)(2)(B).
43
Id. § 220529(b)(2)(C).
44
Id. § 220529(b)(3).
45
Id. § 220529(b)(5).
46
Id. § 220529(c).
47
36 U.S.C. § 220529(d).
48
Id. § 220529(e).
49
374 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2004).
50
Id. at 86.
51
Id
42
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which set of rules applies, each set of rules provides different methods for selecting
arbitrators.52 Therefore, Jacobs petitioned for a court order, pursuant to section four
of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), to compel the arbitration to proceed under
a particular set of AAA rules that the AAA has determined are inapplicable.53
Jacobs, a member of USA Track and Field (“USATF”), an organization
recognized by the USOC as the national governing body for track and field in the
United States, has agreed to follow the rules and regulations of the USATF and
USOC.54 The United States Anti-Doping Agency (“USADA”) is the “independent
anti-doping organization recognized by the USOC for Olympic Sports in the
United States, and is responsible for managing the testing of athletes to determine
the presence of prohibited substances.”55 After a competition in 2003, Jacobs
provided

a

urine

sample

to

the

USADA

and

tested

positive

for

tetrahydrogestrinone (“THG”), an anabolic steroid that is prohibited under antidoping rules.56 She was then charged with a doping violation and threatened with
sanctions, which included a “four-year period of ineligibility in the Olympic
Games, trials, or qualifying events.”57 Jacobs, denying the charges, filed a Demand
for Arbitration with the New York Regional Office of the AAA in order to compel
arbitration under the Commercial Rules.58 The USADA then wrote to the AAA
stating that the “USADA considers [petitioner’s] Demand for Arbitration as notice
that [she] contests the sanction [proposed by USADA] and requests a hearing
under the USADA Protocol and applicable AAA Supplementary Procedures for
Arbitration Initiated by USADA.”59 The parties then sent briefs to the AAA on the

52

Id.
Id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307).
54
Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 87.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 87.
53
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issue of which rules the arbitration should proceed under.60 The AAA then notified
Jacobs that arbitration would proceed under the Supplementary Procedures.61
Jacobs then filed a petition to compel arbitration in the District Court seeking to
compel arbitration under the Commercial Rules.62 The District Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction and denied the petition.63 The Court reviewed USOC and
USATF bylaws and regulations and concluded that “the USATF has conflicting
requirements for the adjudication of alleged doping offenses…”64 The Court then
observed

that

“both

the

Commercial

Rules

and

Supplementary

Procedures…include precisely the same rule with respect to the question of
whether the Court or the arbitrator determines questions of arbitrability.”65 Both
sets of rules provide:
(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect
to the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration
agreement.
(b) The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the
existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration
clause forms a part. Such an arbitration clause shall be
treated as an agreement independent of the terms of the
contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract is
null and void shall not for that reason alone render
invalid the arbitration clause.66

60

Id.
Id. at 88.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88.
65
Id.
66
Id. (citing Commercial Rules, Rule 7; Supplementary Procedures, Rule 8).
61
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The Court stated that whichever set of rules applied, “the parties have agreed that
all questions of arbitrability, including the validity and scope of the arbitration
agreement are reserved for arbitral rather than court determination” in its
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction.67 On appeal, Jacobs argues that the District
Court should have granted her petition to compel arbitration under the Commercial
Rules.68 Although Jacobs agrees that it is for the arbitrators to decide which set of
rules to apply, she argues that “the arbitrators must be selected initially under the
Commercial Rules.”69 The Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s denial of
the petition de novo.70
Jacobs sought to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA,
which provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal
of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any United States district court…for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement…The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.71
Under the FAA, “the role of courts is ‘limited to determining two issues: i)
whether a valid agreement or obligation to arbitrate exists, and ii) whether one
67

Id.
Id.
69
Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88.
70
Id.
71
Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
68
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party to the agreement has failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate.’”72 In Jacobs,
the parties did not refuse to arbitrate; therefore the Court stated that it “need not
interpret the terms of the parties’ agreement.”73 The fact that the USATF and the
USADA, before the AAA, objected to Jacob’s Demand for Arbitration did not
constitute a “refusal to arbitration.”74 Since there was no refusal to arbitrate, the
Court states that Jacobs “cannot use Section 4 as a vehicle to seek review of the
AAA’s decision about how to proceed with the arbitration process.”75 Therefore,
the Second Circuit concluded that the District Court correctly denied her petition to
compel arbitration.76
The Jacobs case illustrates that once an athlete is a participant in a sport
that has a national governing body recognized by the USOC and the member and
the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA, the
arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’
agreement.77 This has important implications for any sport that wishes to be
recognized by the USOC. When Skateboarding and BMX form gain their
respective national governing bodies that are recognized by the USOC, these sports
will also have to submit to the dispute resolution procedures of the USOC, and an
arbitration panel, not the courts, will interpret their agreements.
In Lindland v. USA Wrestling Association, Inc.,78 a case involving athletes
that compete individually similar to the athletes of action sports, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that if the USOC is in “active
concert or participation with a governing body,” it is bound by an order or
injunction by the court regarding arbitration awards.79 Matt Lindland, a Greco-

72

Id. (citing Shaw Group Inc. v. Triplefine Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2003)
(quoting PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1998 (2d Cir. 1996))).
73
Id.
74
Jacobs, 374 F.3d at 88.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
79
Id. at 1006.
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Roman wrestler, wrestled Keith Sieracki in two championship matches to
determine who would gain a spot on the Olympic team for the 2000 Summer
Olympic Games.80 Sieracki won the first match 2-1 and Lindland won the second
match 8-0.81 Lindland, under section 220529(a), a dispute resolution provision of
the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, protested the result of the first
match through USA Wrestling, which is the governing body of amateur wrestling
in the United States.82 The arbitrator for this dispute ordered that Sieracki and
Lindland enter into a rematch.83 As the winner of the rematch, Lindland was to be
the representative in the Olympic Games, but USA Wrestling did not accept that
outcome and instead told the USOC to send Sieracki as its nominee, and to list
Lindland as an alternate in the event of injury.84 Lindland then sought confirmation
of the arbitration award under section nine of the FAA.85 The Seventh Circuit in
that case held that Lindland is entitled to relief, which means being entitled to be
the USA Wrestling nominee.86 USA Wrestling defied this order, as it had defied
the arbitration award. The reasoning given by USA Wrestling for defying the order
was that a second arbitrator, in an arbitration proceeding initiated by Sieracki,
directed USA Wrestling to send Sieracki as its nominee based on the results of the
first match, in which Sieracki had won.87 The court then issued a writ of mandamus
requiring that the district court ensure that the first arbitration award was
implemented “immediately and unconditionally,” as USA Wrestling had decided
to follow the second arbitration reward, which was un-reviewed, rather than
following the decision of a federal court confirming the first award.88 Although
USA Wrestling had agreed to comply with the court order, the USOC refused to
80

Id. at 1001.
Id.
82
Id. at 1002.
83
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002.
81
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send Lindland as its nominee, because it had already sent Sieracki as its nominee
to the International Olympic Committee (IOC).89 Lindland returned to court to
compel the USOC to send his name as the nominee instead of Sieracki, and
Sieracki responded by asking a different district court to confirm the second
arbitration award.90 The proceedings arising out of the dispute were consolidated
and transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, which ordered the USOC to
request that the IOC accept Lindland as its nominee instead of Sieracki.91 The
USOC complied with the order and Sieracki appealed, once again seeking to have
the second arbitration award confirmed.92 Although the deadline had passed for
changes to the roster of Olympic teams, since the IOC has already accepted the
substitution of Lindland for Sieracki after the deadline, the court stated that it
would still address whether or not to confirm the second arbitration award.93 The
confirmation of the award would substitute Sieracki for Lindland once again, and
the court states that since the USOC was willing to make the first change after the
deadline, it would impliedly accept a second change as well.94
The court stated that the second arbitration award could not be confirmed
because the second arbitrator has directed USA Wrestling not to implement the
decision of the first arbitrator. As the first award had already been enforced, the
court could not enforce the second award because the enforcement of incompatible
awards is precluded under Consolidation Coal v. United Mine Workers.95 Even if
the second arbitration award had been the only award, the award could not be
confirmed because the second arbitrator acted ultra vires and violated the
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.96 The Stevens Act,
under section 220529(a), does not authorize a second arbitration proceeding
89

Id.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1002.
94
Id.
95
Id. (citing Consolidation Coal v. United Mine Works, 213 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2000)).
96
Id. at 1003.
90
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regarding the “propriety of another arbitrator’s decision.”97 Section 220529(a)
states:
A party aggrieved by a determination of the corporation
under section 220527 or 220528 of this title may obtain
review by any regional office of the American Arbitration
Association.98
As the first arbitrator is not considered a corporation under the Stevens Act,99 his
determination was not arbitrable under the Act.100 Additionally, the first arbitrator
did not render his decision under section 220527, dealing with remedies that
athletes have within their governing bodies, or under section 220528, dealing with
applications to replace national governing bodies.101 Therefore, a review of the first
determination could not be obtained under the act, and the second arbitration
award was not entitled to confirmation.102
The Lindland case illustrates issues of dispute resolution that can arise
within national governing bodies, as well as the USOC, in Olympic team selection.
This case could have very important implications for action sports athletes that
wish to compete in the Olympic games, not only in terms of the proper selection
procedures for national governing bodies, but for the dispute resolution procedures
to follow under the USOC and the Stevens Act.

97

Id.
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1004 (citing 36 U.S.C. § 220529(a)).
99
Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. §220501).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Hicks v. HSInternational Sports Mgmt., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103138.
98
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DISCUSSION

A.

Endorsement Contracts
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The Hicks case describes a need to narrowly tailor the scope of an
arbitration clause in order to avoid problems such as the problems experienced by
Hicks.103 In that case, Hicks brought several claims against his agent. Hicks argued
that because some of the claims do not involve the interpretation of the agreement,
the claims are not arbitrable. The Court, however, stated that because the
arbitration provision was drafted in a way that was not limited only to disputes
arising out of the agreement, but also disputes arising out of the retention that
resulted in the agreement, Congress’ intent required the court to liberally interpret
the clause in favor of arbitration.104 The Hicks case illustrates the need for
management agreements and endorsement contracts to be drafted in such a way
that limits the scope of the issues that can be brought before an arbitrator or before
the courts.105 This is particularly applicable in the world of Skateboarding and
BMX as some of these athletes have procured major endorsement deals with major
companies. Additionally, some of these athletes also have personal agents
representing them to these companies. If the agreements between the athlete and
their agents, or the athlete and the company they are endorsing, do not limit what
can be submitted to arbitration or to the courts, one of the parties may not be able
to properly vindicate their claims or receive the remedies in which they seek.106

103

Id.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
104
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Olympic Arbitration
If either Skateboarding or BMX had a national governing body recognized

by the USOC as eligible for membership, which neither have currently, they would
not only be required to follow the constitution and bylaws of the committee, but
also the provisions for dispute resolution including arbitration as provided for by
the Act. If, after being recognized as eligible for membership by the USOC, the
member and the committee have agreed to arbitrate their disputes before the AAA,
the arbitration panel, not the courts, shall interpret the terms of the parties’
agreement as evidenced by the Court in the Jacobs case. Skateboarding and BMX
have potential to be included as an Olympic sport, as the action sport of
snowboarding is currently an Olympic sport. Both Skateboarding and BMX have
gained international popularity and each sport has superstar athletes. With the
potential to be an event in the international Olympic games, Skateboarding and
BMX each need to have a national governing body to be recognized by the USOC.
Following the recognition as a national governing body, these sports would be
required to form their own rules and regulations as well as follow the constitution
and bylaws of the USOC and the provisions of the Ted Stevens Amateur and
Olympic Sports Act, including the provisions related to dispute resolution and
arbitration.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Skateboarding and BMX would benefit from having arbitration

agreements in the governing bodies of these sports, in the competitions in which
the athletes of these sports compete, and in the endorsement agreements the
athletes of these sports contract into. With the growing popularity of these sports
on an international level, the issues described above will undoubtedly come into
play. As the popularity continues to grow, the need for agents for many of its
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athletes to assist in the garnishing of endorsement contracts will also grow.
Additionally, as the popularity of these sports continues to rise, potential issues
arising in dispute resolution, including arbitration, will also increase. The
increasing need for dispute resolution provisions in the contracts of these athletes
will require a greater understanding of the arbitration process in order to better
protect and benefit all of the parties involved.

